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Representations of the refugee crisis  
in Denmark: deterrence policies and 
refugee strategies
When (then) Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen gave his New Year’s 
Address on 1 January 2016 he focused particularly on the high number of 
refugees and asylum seekers who came to Europe and Denmark in 2015.1 
The number both pressed and challenged Denmark, he said and then 
continued:
Let us be honest with each other – we are challenged: it challenges our 
economy when we have to spend many more billions on asylum seekers and 
refugees. Money that could otherwise go to health, education and several 
private jobs. … It challenges our cohesion when many come from very differ-
ent cultures. Strangers to the unwritten rules and norms that are so obvious 
to us. Because we have grown up in a tradition of freedom and equality. 
… And it basically challenges our values and image of who we really are. 
(Statsministeriet, 2016)2
These statements offer a particular framing of the encounter between the 
Danish state and the refugees arriving at the Danish borders. There are 
different themes at stake here. The encounter is framed as having both 
economic, cultural, and democratic implications. It even becomes a chal-
lenge to Danish self-identity as the Prime Minister claimed.
Prem Kumar Rajaram (2015) argued that the refugee crisis must be 
understood as a representation: ‘The refugee crisis in Europe is fabricated’. 
When we seek to understand the crisis and its particular consequences, we 
need to investigate the crisis as a particular framing that works to construct 
an idea of the refugee. This framing can be compared and contrasted with 
one which has outward aims, a framing which reduces the complexities of 
the situation to an abstracted understanding, allowing policy-makers and 
commentators to treat it as an exceptional condition. The first aim of this 
chapter is to investigate how the crisis was represented and framed in the 
case of Denmark. The refugee crisis arrived in Denmark the first Sunday of 
September 2015. Before that particular day, the crisis was understood as 
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taking place on Greek islands, in Eastern Europe or at German train sta-
tions. It had little to do with Denmark. That perception changed abruptly 
during the early days of September. During the following week, 1,500 refu-
gees entered the country. The second aim of this chapter is to provide an 
analysis of the deterrence policies set up by Danish authorities from 2015 
and to investigate the rationale behind them. The third aim is to illustrate 
how civil society and refugees reacted to the deterrence policies. This third 
part provides short examples of civil society responses as well as examples 
of strategies used by refugees individually and collectively to cope with the 
(policy) regime.3 In these analyses, I focus on three main concepts, which I 
unpack in the different parts of the chapter: deterrence policies, institutional 
uncertainty, and deportable populations.
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. The refugee crisis legiti-
mised an even more restrictive policy shift than experienced during the 
previous decades. The new approach, termed as a paradigmatic shift, has 
the support of both the previous government and the present Social Demo-
cratic government. Besides creating extreme institutional uncertainty caused 
by continuous policy changes, it also extended the category of deportable 
populations to a degree where integration from both a policy perspective 
and from the perspective of the refugees becomes pointless, as the refugee 
is, with the recent policy change, always at risk of being forced to leave the 
country. The paradigmatic shift in this way becomes an example of bureau-
cratic violence legitimised through the refugee crisis (see also the Introduc-
tion of this volume).
The method used in this chapter is based on a mix of participant obser-
vation, informal interviews, desk research, and textual analysis. The mate-
rial used in the third section is part of broader ethnographic fieldwork. I 
have been working with asylum seekers both as an activist and as a militant 
researcher (Jørgensen, 2019; Lindberg et al., 2018). Militant research con-
nects to Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ (1995) call for a militant anthropology 
and the primacy of the ethical, and for anthropologists to become morally 
and politically engaged. My own approach and work draw on this norma-
tive point of departure. Here, I mainly use it to provide short examples of 
responses to the Danish policy regime and the strategies used by refugees 
to navigate these policies. Moreover, some observations stem from the on-
going data collection for a project on migrants’ digital practices (the 
DIGINAUTS project), where we focus particularly on anti-deportation and 
return strategies among migrants in Denmark and Germany.4
Framing the crisis – encounters
What made politicians, policy-makers, and, to some degree, academics 
construct what has since been called the refugee crisis in 2015? Migrants 
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had been crossing the Mediterranean for years with grave humanitar-
ian consequences. Manuela Bojadžijev and Sandro Mezzadra (2015) claim 
that the ‘geography of the current crisis is significantly different’ from the 
years before. Three events in 2015 can be said to inaugurate what has 
since been described as the refugee crisis (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). 
The first happened on 19 April 2015, when a ship transporting over eight 
hundred migrants and refugees capsized en route from Tripoli to Italy and 
all but twenty-seven persons drowned or went missing (Bonomolo and 
Kirchgaessner, 2015). The second incident was the image of the drowned 
Syrian child Alan Kurdi, whose body was washed ashore on 3 September 
near Bodrum in Turkey, after his family’s failed attempt to reach the Greek 
island of Kos. The third event, which gave way to the narrative of the 
refugee crisis, happened the day after that on 4 September. Thousands of 
migrants and refugees had been encamped at the Budapest Keleti railway 
station, and Hungarian police had started denying them access to the trains 
and were beginning to reroute them towards detention camps outside the 
city (De Genova, 2016a). More than a thousand migrants and refugees then 
self-mobilised and started chanting ‘freedom!’ and soon took to the road, 
heading towards Vienna in what was soon called ‘the March of Hope’. The 
Hungarian authorities changed tactics and with opportunistic motivations 
assisted the marchers towards Austria and Germany who then declared 
their borders to be open (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b).
However, the crisis narrative is not only situated fluidly in time but also 
spatially constructed. For instance, for South Eastern and Central Eastern 
European countries, a triggering event was the closure of the Hungarian 
border on 15 September 2015. In Italy, the shipwreck outside Sicily on 19 
April 2015 was another triggering event. In Greece, a critical event was the 
closure of the Balkan route on 18 February 2016 and the debate over 
excluding Greece from Schengen. All these examples are given by Trian-
dafyllidou (2017, p. 199), who argues that ‘there is an interactive relation-
ship between specific events that take place and their coverage and de-/
re-construction through media and political discourse. In other words there 
is an interactive link between factual events and related representations and 
speech events’. We can continue from this premise and argue that a particu-
lar framing and coverage of an event (or encounter) can and will have 
material effects beyond the representation and speech event as it informs 
policy-making and political initiatives, as we shall see from the Danish case.
In terms of policy developments, the refugee crisis caused a domino effect 
when the migrant and refugee flows advanced from the southern and south-
eastern part of Europe towards Central and Northern Europe. Within a 
very short time, most of the EU member states claimed that they were 
unable to cope with the situation and found themselves in a state of emer-
gency, which called for – and also allowed for – exceptional measures. In 
reality, these exceptional measures breached the principle of free mobility 
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for citizens and legally tolerated non-citizens within most of the EU accord-
ing to the Schengen Agreement. This free mobility was de facto cancelled, 
at least in the south-to-north direction. Tensions arose around specific 
internal borders within the EU where border controls were re-installed, such 
as between France and Germany, Germany and Austria, Slovenia and 
Austria, Germany and Denmark, and Denmark and Sweden (Agustin and 
Jørgensen, 2019b).
The refugee crisis in Denmark
As mentioned above, the refugee crisis came to Denmark the first Sunday of 
September 2015. The Sunday encounter had its own timeline and spurred 
different reactions from both the public and the authorities. That afternoon, 
the first large group of refugees and migrants arrived at the small town 
of Rødby on the island of Lolland some 150 kilometres south of Copen-
hagen. They came by ferry from Germany, but fled beyond the nearby 
fields at Rødby Ferry Station for fear of being registered and forced to 
apply for asylum in Denmark. A larger group started to walk on the E47 
motorway towards Sweden (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Five hundred 
refugees crossed the border within twenty hours and the situation was 
described as chaotic and out of control (Róin, 2016). The long summer 
of migration had come to Denmark. In the media, the group of pedes-
trians were termed both migrants and refugees (e.g. TV2, 13 September 
2015).
The following Wednesday night, the police gave up detaining the hun-
dreds of refugees who refused to cooperate or be registered. As some refu-
gees had blocked trains, the Danish police gave safe passage to all the 
refugees who stayed in the towns of Padborg and Rødby, both close to the 
German border. They were allowed to move onwards to Sweden, which 
was, as mentioned, the initial destination for the vast majority of them. 
Interestingly, this decision was praised by both the (then) Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Justice (at the time). While the number of asylum 
applications Denmark received over the course of 2015 was much lower 
than in Sweden,5 the increase in asylum applications – over 40 per cent 
higher than the preceding year – was noticeable (Agustin and Jørgensen, 
2019b). During the peak of the ‘crisis’ in November 2015, Danish police6 
estimated that between 7,500 and 11,000 people were crossing into 
Denmark from Germany each week (Jørgensen, 2016).
The decision of many refugees to use Denmark mainly as a transit-
country rather than a destination paradoxically caused mixed feelings 
among the Danish public. In a way, this should not come as a surprise. 
Only months before, the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 
had paid for an advert in four Lebanese newspapers informing readers 
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about the conditions of asylum seekers in Denmark and restrictions in terms 
of family reunification, halving of social benefits, and so on. The advert 
begins: ‘Denmark has decided to tighten the regulations concerning refugees 
in a number of areas’ (BBC, 2015). Although the adverts must be seen as 
also being a highly symbolic act, as it is difficult to assess if any of the 
incoming refugees had heard of these particular restrictions, the Danish 
authorities were claiming it to be a success when refugees chose not to apply 
for asylum in Denmark. Some of the reasons given by refugees crossing 
through Denmark for moving on to Sweden have to do with the restrictive 
Danish policy regime. Many refugees stated that temporary residence 
permits, the negative rhetoric about refugees, and especially the restrictions 
for family reunification (in Denmark a minimum one year of waiting before 
reunification, compared to a few months in Sweden and Finland at the time) 
made them travel onwards (Christensen and Bolvinkel, 2015). Likewise, 
existing networks and the lowering of social benefits targeting asylum 
seekers played a role in deciding where to go and where to apply for asylum 
(Christensen and Bolvinkel, 2015). Among the public this caused reactions. 
Some people thought the refugees were ungrateful. Although many did not 
want them to apply for asylum in Denmark, the fact that they did not wish 
to was also seen as a problem (Jyllands-Posten, 11 September 2015). Some 
of the political opponents of the then Minister of Integration, Inger Støj-
berg, blamed her for having given Denmark a bad name (Politiken, 8 Sep-
tember 2015). Others were upset that Denmark did very little to actively 
help solve the refugee crisis and claimed that the Danish authorities should 
accept many more refugees than they had done at the time (DR, 2015). The 
decision to offer the Sweden-bound refugees safe-conduct to pass through 
the country led to criticism from other EU member states. The Swedish 
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven (from the Social Democrats) was heavily 
critical of the Danish response, and the chairperson of the Swedish Left 
Party (Vänsterpartiet) termed Denmark ‘Hungary Light’ (Expressen, 10 
September 2015).
Policy encounters – deterrence over welcoming
In outlining the ways the refugee crisis has been framed and how the Danish 
state encountered the ‘crisis’ once people started crossing the borders, 
my argument is that a particular framing has particular implications and 
consequences for how policy initiatives are developed to solve the alleged 
problems. The response of the Danish state can be analysed as comprising 
a number of different actions: re-bordering practices, the strengthening of 
deterrence policies, motivating enhancement measures to make (rejected) 
asylum seekers leave the country, and increasing bureaucratisation (see 
also the Introduction of this volume). The crisis was framed as something 
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out of control, something creating insecurity for the Danish population 
(as in discussions of the growth of terrorism or terrorists hiding among 
refugees) and something that would mean a blow to the Danish welfare 
state. The refugee crisis was thus framed as challenging Danish security. 
The efforts introduced would be means to maintaining security, order and 
welfare.
Border control: re-bordering practices
The Danish government followed the path set by other European countries 
when it strengthened border controls on 4 January 2016, due to an ‘excep-
tional’ situation which allowed for suspending the Schengen Agreement on 
freedom of movement (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). The decision was 
made the same day as Sweden announced that it would introduce strength-
ened (förstärkta) border controls in the direction from Denmark to Sweden. 
However, already before this, six other countries (Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Malta and Norway) had implemented similar forms of border 
controls. According to the Danish Prime Minister, in early January 2016, 
91,000 refugees entered Denmark. Thirteen thousand of those applied for 
asylum, while the rest were expected to have entered Norway or Sweden 
(Kofoed, 2016). When most of the incoming refugees were only passing 
through Denmark, the situation was perceived as less grave, but with the 
de facto border closures directed against unwanted migrants on their way 
to the neighbouring Nordic countries, the perception changed.
Since then, the temporary border controls have been extended several 
times with the approval of the EU due to the alleged state of emergency. 
Across the Danish political landscape – with the exception of the most leftist 
parties, the social liberals, and Alternativet (a party resembling Green 
parties in other countries) – there has been a consensus on the need to limit 
the number of asylum applicants. Numerous political actors inside and 
outside the government welcomed the legislative changes with reference to 
the state of emergency the country was believed to be in (Jørgensen, 2016). 
Most political parties deemed the new measures to be fair and appropriate, 
considering the exceptional circumstances. A framing of the ‘crisis’ as being 
a challenge to security and welfare unfolded, which legitimised exclusivist, 
restrictive practices and policies. In October 2018, the government managed 
to get the border controls extended for another six months. The EU Parlia-
ment was against this development and, in the spring of 2018, a majority 
within the EU parliament issued a report stating that the border controls 
were damaging the EU in terms of the economy and mutual trust between 
member states. However, the Minister of Integration at the time, Inger 
Støjberg, and the rest of the Danish government showed no intention of 
changing the extended control and prioritised what they believed to be the 
interest of Denmark.
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Deterrence policies
Alongside the physical control at the external borders and the re-bordering 
practices, we also find more implicit measures, which had the purpose of 
deterring people by decreasing the alleged attractiveness of Denmark as a 
destination for asylum seekers. The former government implemented a 
number of initiatives aimed to decrease the number of arriving refugees and 
thereby the number of people being granted asylum in Denmark. I have 
already mentioned highly symbolic acts such as the adverts in Lebanese 
newspapers as one example of what we can term deterrence policies. While 
some were overt measures to reduce flows, such as of temporary controls 
at the border with Germany, others, as mentioned, were intended instead 
to decrease the attractiveness of Denmark. The most contentious of these 
has been labelled the Jewellery Law (see also chapter 2), which was adopted 
in January 2016. This bill introduced additional limitations on access to 
permanent residency, extended waiting periods for family reunification, and 
legalised the confiscation of valuables worth more than DKK 10,000 
(approximately EUR 1,300) from arriving refugees.
While different governments have, since the turn of the century, made it 
more difficult to obtain permanent residence, these conditions were further 
restricted as a response to the refugee crisis. Previously, refugees who 
had been in the country for eight years and shown what is described as 
a will to integrate, but not yet met specific goals pertaining to what is 
perceived as active citizenship, level of income, higher level of Danish 
proficiency, and employment (which are taken to signify integration and 
commonly referred to as integration criteria) could get easier access to 
permanent residency. This possibility was removed in the wake of the pro-
claimed crisis. Instead, a combination of residency duration and so-called 
integration criteria is currently required to obtain permanent residency. 
This follows a long list of attempts by different governments to restrict 
immigrants’ rights to welfare citizenship since 2001 (see also chapters 5  
and 12).
Deterrence has clearly been a primary motivation behind these and other 
initiatives. Across the political landscape – with the exception of the most 
leftist parties, the social liberals, and Alternativet – there has been a con-
sensus on the need to limit the number of refugees applying for asylum. As 
highlighted above, numerous political actors inside and outside the govern-
ment have welcomed the legislative changes with reference to the state of 
emergency the country is claimed to be in. Most political parties deemed 
the new measures to be fair and appropriate, considering the circumstances. 
For instance, the Social Democrats’ spokesperson for Integration at the 
time, Nicolai Wammen, stated that ‘We are in an extraordinary situation 
where up to 200 asylum seekers arrive on a daily level to Denmark and 
that calls for extraordinary decisions’ (quoted in Drachmann, 2015).
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The cornerstone of the government’s reforms in 2015 was the reintroduc-
tion of the integration benefit.7 This is an allowance given to newly arrived 
refugees that is purposefully low, as it is intended to encourage integration 
by incentivising work, but according to the Minister of Integration at the 
time, Inger Støjberg, it also has an outspoken deterrence goal. When intro-
ducing the regulations, she stated, ‘We must tighten up, so we can control 
the inflow of asylum seekers coming to Denmark … This is the first in a 
line of restrictions which the government will implement to get the foreign-
ers issue [fremmedesagen] under control again’ (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 
2015). The lowering of the social benefit was thus meant to reduce the 
number of people being interested in applying for asylum in Denmark. 
However, it is difficult to assess if the integration benefit had the direct effect 
the government was hoping for, as the numbers of asylum seekers entering 
other European member states also dropped after 2016. Other countries 
implemented different forms of deterrence policies. Nevertheless, we can 
also see that the number of asylum seekers entering Denmark is historically 
low. New statistics from February 2019 shows that only 5 out of 1,000 
asylum seekers entering Europe apply for asylum in Denmark. During the 
last twenty years the rate was between 10 and 15 out of 1,000 (Andersen 
and Larsen, 2019).
Despite the acclaimed success of the restrictions mentioned above and 
the very few people actually applying for asylum in Denmark, the Conser-
vative government, supported by the Danish People’s Party, used the Finance 
Bill in 2019 to introduce a number of further restrictions targeting refugees 
having obtained asylum: ‘Now, the immigration policy is being further 
expanded with a number of significant initiatives to ensure that the tempo-
rary protection in Denmark does not become permanent when the need for 
protection ceases’ (Finansministeriet, 2019, p. 25). Moreover, ‘rules and 
practices need to be adapted so that an asylum permit no longer has to be 
considered as an admission ticket to live in Denmark when you no longer 
have a need for protection’ (Finansministeriet, 2019, p. 26). In concrete 
terms, this entailed reducing welfare benefits even more. NGOs already 
point to the damaging effects of the previous benefit level and foresee 
increased and protracted levels of poverty. The lowering of the allowance 
is meant both to have a deterrence effect, making it less favourable to apply 
for asylum in Denmark, as well as sending a signal of a hard demand for 
self-sufficiency to the people already living in Denmark. The lowering of 
the benefit is only one among a number of new restrictions. They are part 
of a paradigmatic shift in immigration policy. The Social Democrats support 
this shift, which makes change difficult (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019a). As 
emphasised in the quotation above from the Finance Bill, this shift entails 
a focus on return and deportation. The integration benefit, for instance, 
was renamed as the return benefit (hjemrejseydelse), which sends an unmis-
takable message to the recipient about their stay being temporary. Other 
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policy measures include further restrictions on access to permanent resi-
dency and access to family reunification. In sum, the new restrictions make 
temporariness the central concern in the policy framework. Refugees, 
regardless of their achievements and time of residency in Denmark, are 
expected to leave. Consequently, integration (as it is portrayed in the Finance 
Bill) is basically not possible, and refugees remain deportable populations. 
Nicholas De Genova (2016, p. 2) argues that ‘within any given regime of 
immigration-related conditionalities … and contingencies, migrants always 
remain more or less deportable’ and describes this as an “economy” of 
deportability: even if all non-citizens are potentially subject to deportation, 
not everyone is deported, and not everyone is subject to deportation to the 
same degree’ (2016, p. 2).
Another set of measures are the ‘motivation enhancement measures’, 
which target rejected asylum seekers who cannot be deported, as well as 
immigrants living in Denmark on tolerated stay (that is, immigrants with 
a criminal record and/or a deportation order which cannot be executed 
because their country of origin is not safe or will not receive them (see 
Freedom of Movement Research Collective, 2018). The conditions in the 
deportation centres Kærshovedgaard and Sjælsmark, where these people on 
tolerated stay live, are extremely harsh and offer little possibility of an 
autonomous everyday life. The immigrants living there receive only a 
minimal allowance, are not allowed to cook for themselves, and have to 
register their whereabouts (e.g. Canning, 2019; see also chapter 12). These 
provisions seem to have had the desired effect for the government. New 
numbers show that 328 out of 447 people placed at Kærshovedgaard have 
disappeared without the authorities knowing where they are (Ibfelt and 
Skov-Jensen, 2019). While such disappearances may pose a security threat 
or be taken as a sign that the government is unable to achieve the desired 
control of the unwanted population, they have been used to explain the 
government’s ultimate desire, which is to expel refugees without breaking 
the Geneva Convention. When interrogated about the disappearances, Inger 
Støjberg responded: ‘The idea is of course that they have to go home to the 
country they came from. But I have always been aware that some are trying 
[to get asylum] in other countries’. The Danish People’s Party’s spokesper-
son on integration gave a similar response: ‘This is a small success. Under-
stood in the sense that they leave and travel to another European country 
and stay there rather than stay in Denmark. So in this way it is of course 
good’ (Ibfelt and Skov-Jensen, 2019).
Extreme bureaucratic and legal uncertainty
Since June 2015, the Ministry of Foreigners and Integration introduced 
more than 100 restrictions pertaining to non-citizens. Of these, more than 
half relate directly to asylum seekers. With the change of government and 
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the appointment of a new minister, this development could change but it is 
too early to tell if this will be the case. The more or less constant changes 
in immigration policy make it very difficult to navigate the system. Refu-
gees, especially, experience a system that can change overnight and where 
the procedure is never set. A new report by the Danish Refugee Council 
shows that people with a refugee background experience stress, dissatisfac-
tion, depression, and anxiety because of the constant legal changes (Dansk 
Flygtningehjælp, 2019).
In her work on irregular migrants, Bridget Anderson (2010, p. 300) 
claims that the methodical making of ‘institutional uncertainty’ helps 
‘produce “precarious workers” over whom employers and labour users 
have particular mechanisms of control’. In this context, immigration con-
trols function both as ‘a tap regulating the flow of labour’ and as ‘a mould 
shaping certain forms of labour’ (2010, p. 301). There is an inter-play of 
entrant categories, employment relations and construction of institution-
alised uncertainty steered by immigration controls to form particular types 
of labour and relations to employers and the labour market (2010, p. 301). 
The legal status of the migrant is produced by immigration control, which 
at the same time produces other types of illegality.
There is a parallel between Anderson’s analysis and the situation for 
refugees in the Danish context. Even when people with refugee status have 
found employment or education, they are never safe from deportation, as 
the principle of temporariness trumps other concerns. With the newest 
restrictions, 25,000 people who have recognised refugee statuses are at risk 
of being deported if the situations in their home countries are deemed to 
be safe, which illustrates how deportable populations are constructed within 
the policy framework. Of these, 8,700 people are now in paid employment 
and do what is expected of them in terms of integrating into the labour 
market (Andersen and Larsen, 2019). The decision to declare a country safe 
can seem quite arbitrary, as it results more from bilateral agreements with 
economic gains than a genuine assessment of security risks. As an example, 
Somalia is now considered a safe country by the Danish authorities despite 
the ironic fact that Danish civil servants from the Foreigners’ Service who 
negotiated the return agreement with the Somali government never dared 
to leave the airport in Mogadishu as it was not deemed safe enough for 
them (Ottesen, 2017). The Danish civil servants trusted the assessment of 
the Institute for Economics and Peace that the country is not considered a 
dangerous place despite its ranking as the fifth most dangerous country in 
the world.8 As a result of the agreement, hundreds of Somalis with refugee 
statuses living in Denmark now face deportation.
At the same time as the new restrictions were launched, existing practices 
such as family reunification were subjected to increased bureaucratisation. 
A lack of transparency (for example, rights being conditional on other 
policy measures such as the strategy against ‘parallel societies’ in social 
housing schemes or the discretionary power of civil servants assessing 
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the applications) indirectly serves as an exclusionary mechanism and as a 
deterrence measure. It can be argued that the Danish state is establishing 
an extreme version of bureaucratic and legal uncertainty for both asylum 
seekers and people with refugee statuses. In addition, despite the many 
public concerns for refugees’ lack of integration, the current restrictive 
policies (emphasised also by the Finance Bill) seem to make integration 
pointless or impossible.
Civil society and refugees responding to the politics of deterrence 
and uncertainty
In this section, I provide some examples of how civil society and ref-
ugees (individually and collectively) have reacted to the Danish policy 
developments.
Welcoming over deterrence
The visibility of the crisis generated a myriad of solidarity initiatives and 
created/reactivated networks seeking to help and assist refugees. Thou-
sands of people became involved in solidarity work within a very short 
period. Many people acted in civil disobedience and became criminalised 
‘humanitarian smugglers’ by offering transportation to refugees wanting to 
go to Sweden. Some sailed groups of refugees over the Öresund to Sweden, 
whereas others crossed the bridge with refugees hidden in their cars (Agustin 
and Jørgensen, 2019b). These acts presented a dilemma to the government. 
On the one hand, the people in solidarity solved a problem for the state by 
moving an unwanted population away from Denmark; on the other hand, 
the authorities were also concerned that such acts in themselves could be an 
incentive for refugees to come to Denmark. It is in this political landscape 
that Venligboerne (literally friendly neighbours) emerged. The network 
dates back longer than 2015, though. The movement was not originally 
aimed at doing solidarity work with refugees, but was developed as an initia-
tive in a social centre in Northern Jutland. The Venligboerne groups have a 
number of shared aims, such as: providing legal aid, practical help, medical 
support, language training, job-seeking assistance and everyday donations; 
creating broad alliances including both experienced activists and people 
new to solidarity work; setting up social centres; making the problems 
of the asylum process and integration into Danish society visible; practis-
ing a humanitarian approach different from the exclusivist and restrictiv-
ist approach characterising the state; and articulating the commonalities 
between people, refugees, and Danes alike (Jørgensen and Olsen, 2020). 
Venligboerne is one of the groups welcoming refugees which were active 
during the ‘long summer of migration’ and after (Jørgensen and Olsen, 
2020). With the arrival of a large number of refugees, the Venligboerne 
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initiative grew rapidly when it was introduced as an alternative way of 
meeting refugees. From here, the initiative spread across Denmark (and even 
outside the country) and received increasing attention as a way to counter 
the state’s deterrence policies (Jørgensen and Olsen, 2020). The refugee 
crisis is, without doubt, a defining moment in explaining the strengthening 
and spread of civic solidarity, but it also links in with previous solidarity 
networks (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Venligboerne provide many roles 
in the encounter between civil society and migrants. The local groups have 
been vital in creating a space of inclusion where newcomers are received as 
peers. The power of Venligboerne lies firstly in its ability to forge alliances 
between different civil society organisations, networks, and refugee groups, 
and secondly in its flexibility and ability to adapt to the policy developments. 
When the government tightened aspects of the Foreigners’ Law and regula-
tions for asylum seekers, Venligboerne responded not only with a critique 
(of the asylum regime) but also with concrete actions.
While a strong welcoming culture may be important in the lives of 
individuals, it does not necessarily hold the power to change existing poli-
cies. Venligboerne has had an internal discussion regarding the politics it 
performs. Some members – including the original founder – regard it as 
a non-political organisation, whereas other members regard it as a non-
formal political organisation (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019b). Although 
Venligboerne has not been able to change the general political direction 
(towards increased restrictions and worsening conditions for refugees) it 
has been able to challenge the system by legal means. For instance, the 
government has made it more difficult to actually use refugees’ right to 
family reunification. Even when all conditions for bringing one’s family 
to Denmark are fulfilled, the criteria that the person applying for family 
reunification must bear all costs makes it de facto impossible. This is 
particularly the case for unaccompanied minors. To deal with this situa-
tion, Venligboerne created the group Venligboerne samler ind til flygtninge 
(friendly neighbours collect [donations] for refugees), which collects money 
to pay for these costs. The donations come from art shows, book sales and 
so on, and the organisation has created a very professional infrastructure to 
make the process efficient. In August 2018, the organisation had reunited 
more than 138 refugees and family members (BT, 2018). It has managed 
to uphold a high level of mobilisation and continuity. In 2018, three years 
after the initial mobilisation, the various Venligboerne chapters counted 
more than one hundred local groups and had more than 150,000 members 
(Fenger-Grøndahl, 2017).
Refugee activism and initiatives
One strategy used by refugees is empowerment through knowledge sharing. 
An example is visAvis, which is a publication put together by migrants. 
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visAvis describes itself as: ‘a magazine on asylum and migration, the move-
ment of people across borders and the challenges connected to this. We 
work to improve the debate on asylum and migration, among other things 
by publishing texts that people seeking asylum want to share’ (visAvis, nd.). 
The description of the background for producing the magazine continues: 
‘visAvis is produced by people with or without citizenship living in Denmark. 
From our point of view the policies regarding migration and asylum are 
repressive. People seeking refuge are made suspect and migrants are made 
illegal’ and ‘[i]n this precarious situation we wish to raise the level of debate, 
enhance the quality of information, and create a space where it is possible 
for people seeking asylum to express what is on their mind’ (visAvis, nd.). 
It represents a type of citizen journalism with the peculiar fact that it is 
produced (primarily) by non-citizens; that is, people excluded from the 
protectionist framework of citizenship. What we see here are people claim-
ing a presence and a public voice. Engin Isin (2008) regards such events as 
constituting acts of citizenship. Investigating acts of citizenship entails 
‘focus[ing] on those moments when, regardless of status and substance, 
subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or, better still, as those to whom 
the rights to have rights is due’ (Isin, 2008, p. 18). Reviving political con-
flict, here in problematising the authorities’ handling of asylum seekers and 
treatment of rejected asylum seekers, is a mode for making asylum seekers 
visible as political subjects. Refugees are active agents in constructing and 
disseminating an intrinsic knowledge about conditions, struggles and politi-
cal claims in Denmark.
Another strategy has been acts of disobedience. The conditions in the 
deportation centres Sjælsmark and Kærshovedgaard have spurred varying 
actions and confrontations. Right now, there is a network of actors protest-
ing in different ways against children growing up at Sjælsmark (demonstra-
tions, solidarity events, occupations, etc.). The network unites a very diverse 
range of actors and has received considerable attention. So far, the govern-
ment and parts of the opposition (the Social Democrats) have not reacted, 
but there are small signs of a change in opinion as the media (both national 
and international) keep highlighting the conditions in Sjælsmark. The 
rejected asylum seekers living in Kærshovedgaard tried another tactic by 
initiating a hunger strike in 2017 (see Lindberg et al. 2018). The strike also 
drew the media’s attention, and the parliamentary Ombudsman visited the 
facility. In the end, however, nothing changed and the people forced to live 
in Kærshovedgaard have to deal with worse conditions than before.
Rejected asylum seekers have started leaving Denmark but not returning 
to their home countries. For some, being able to stay in Denmark against 
all the odds has not seemed possible. From the refugees I have been in 
contact with at asylum centres and one deportation centre, life, especially 
in the deportation centre, causes anxiety, depression, and a profound sense 
of powerlessness. Families started leaving at night without the employees 
Martin Bak Jørgensen - 9781526146847
Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 04/09/2021 05:05:07PM
via free access
80 Refugees and the violence of welfare bureaucracies
of the centres knowing. Some people with the status of rejected asylum 
seekers have sought church asylum in Germany, which has turned out to 
be a second chance for some. German churches grant protection to refugees 
facing difficult situations, called hardship cases. The churches then present 
a request to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany for 
further examination. Venligboerne samler ind has also supported these 
actions. The organisation, for instance, helped finance an Afghani family 
to reach Germany, where they sought church asylum and obtained the right 
to stay. People with Afghani background have travelled to France at times 
when the country started re-assessing the claims of Afghani asylum seekers 
(Ibfelt and Aaberg, 2019). However, the journeys are all towards the 
unknown, and some of my interlocutors are now living as irregular migrants 
in European countries with no chance of either returning to their home 
countries or obtaining asylum under the current regime(s). It is not only 
rejected asylum seekers, who for obvious reasons live in extremely precari-
ous conditions facing forced deportation, but also asylum-seeking families 
and individuals staying on temporary residence permit who have started to 
leave Denmark.
Conclusion
What does the future look like for refugees in Denmark? The discussion in 
this chapter has firstly posed the question of how the Danish authorities 
framed the refugee crisis and, secondly, how a framing of the situation as 
a sustained and protracted emergency legitimised a long series of restrictions 
for both new asylum seekers and refugees (and migrants) already residing 
in the country. The previous government introduced a number of immediate 
policy measures to face the ‘crisis’. This included reinstatement of border 
controls and, more importantly, the introduction of deterrence measures. 
The overall policy goal has been to create a migration regime deterring 
potential asylum seekers from applying for asylum in Denmark. However, 
the policy measures not only target potentially arriving refugees but also 
the ones who have been in Denmark for years. The refugee crisis was thus 
used to expand the category of deportable populations. Whereas this cat-
egory previously included rejected asylum seekers and migrants residing in 
Denmark on ‘tolerated stay’ (see above), the category has been expanded 
to also include refugees who had their claim for asylum accepted, who were 
re-united with their families, and who are in paid employment, learning 
Danish and so on. The politicisation of the question of who can hold the 
right to stay in Denmark created enormous insecurity. The government 
described the new policy approach as a paradigmatic shift – basically 
seeking to solve the refugee issue outside the EU’s (or at least Denmark’s) 
external borders, and which stresses temporality as a main factor (Frelick, 
Kysel, and Podkul, 2018). This approach aligns with the discussions within 
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the EU of externalising the asylum procedures and establishing asylum 
application centres outside EU territories. The refugee crisis was used to 
legitimise this shift. As shown, it created extreme bureaucratic and legal 
uncertainty due to constant policy changes and to the expansion of the 
category of deportable populations. The approach bases itself on policy 
mechanisms and serves to make life unliveable in Denmark. A final conse-
quence of the shift is that, in practice, it makes integration an impossible 
task, as having arrived as a refugee will always make you prone to deporta-
tion (see also De Genova, 2016b). In June 2019, Denmark inaugurated a 
new government when the Social Democrats won the election and, sup-
ported by the social liberal and the leftist parties, formed a minority govern-
ment. It is too early to say if this will lead to any substantial policy changes, 
but everything seems to point away from a reversal of the restrictive poli-
cies. The Social Democrats support the paradigmatic shift and won the 
elections through promises of keeping the strict course on immigration 
(Agustin and Jørgensen, 2019a). However, the new Minister of Integration 
promised to improve conditions for children living at Sjælsmark, and 
recently suggested that it was time to slow down the restrictive policies, 
which could reduce the feeling of uncertainty to an extent. The government 
also opened up the possibility for allowing refugees to enrol in education, 
as was the case in the past. The main message is the same, however, and 
the foundation for restrictive policies continues to be the assumption that 
Denmark needs to be made less attractive to those wishing to re-establish 
their lives within its borders. For example, former Prime Minister Løkke 
Rasmussen explained that he understood the reasons Somalis prefer to live 
in a welfare state compared to life in Mogadishu and that he intends to 
follow existing rules.9
The restrictive policy regime has polarised Danish society. On the one 
hand, we see an organisation such as Venligboerne gaining popularity and 
being able to uphold a high level of mobilisation and engagement over time. 
On the other hand, we see continued support, not only for right-wing 
parties, but also for the restrictive position taken by the Social Democrats. 
Deterrence policies are likely to mark the future of the Danish political 
reality, and uncertainty may destroy the groundwork that strengthens the 
integration of migrants, including refugees. In the final part of this chapter, 
I have sketched out some of the nascent tendencies including the departure 
of the unwanted ones. In the end, people may decide not to stay in Denmark 
against all the odds.
Notes
1 When I mention government in this chapter I refer to the Liberal Party (Venstre)-
led governments in power from June 2015 to June 2019. In June 2019 a Social 
Democratic government took power.
2 All translations from Danish to English are by the author.
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3 In this chapter, I use both ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. Although I prefer the term 
migrant to cover all mobile populations and thus underline their agency, several 
of the people I talked to during participant observation termed themselves refu-
gees, so in order to respect this categorical self-identification I use both terms.
4 See www.en.cgs.aau.dk/research/projects/diginauts/. Accessed 12 February 2020.
5 Denmark received nearly 21,000 applications or 1.5 per cent of the EU total, 
while Sweden received approximately 160,000 or 11.7 per cent of the EU total.
6 ‘Skønsmæssig vurdering af indrejste udlændinge’, Politi, published (last updated) 
13 June 2016, www.politi.dk/da/aktuelt/nyheder/skoensmaessig_vurdering_af_
indrejste_udlaendinge.htm. Accessed 12 February 2019.
7 The Liberal-Conservative governments from 2001–2011 implemented a lower 
social benefit, the ‘Start Allowance’, targeting newcomers who had lived in 
Denmark for the last seven out of eight years (i.e. including Danish citizens who 
had lived abroad). The Social Democratic-led government (2011–2015) abol-
ished this benefit.
8 www.atlasandboots.com/most-dangerous-countries-in-the-world-ranked/. 
Accessed 12 February 2020.
9 P1 Morgen, DR, 7 August.
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